No issue deserves more scrutiny than the mechanisms whereby popular unrest unleashes civil wars. We argue that one institution-two-tiered security systemsare particularly pernicious in terms of the accompanying civil war risk. These systems' defining characteristic is the juxtaposition of small communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular armed forces that deter external opponents. These systems aggravate civil war risks because stacked security units lack the size to repress widespread dissent, but inhibit rapid regime change through coup d'état. Regular militaries, meanwhile, fracture when ordered to employ force against populations from which they were recruited.
Introduction
Perhaps no security issue deserves more scrutiny than the risk of revolutions provoking civil wars. Liberal democracies normatively support, at least in principle, populations' efforts to unseat authoritarian rulers. Many revolutions, however, give way to civil wars rather than democratic consolidation. When protracted wars follow revolutions they kill more individuals and generate greater disruption than the revolutions themselves. Even once one side prevails, many post-revolutionary states succumb to further civil wars, which inflict additional damage.
A growing body of scholarship explores how civil-military institutions shape military responses to uprisings. Building on this literature, we argue that how prerevolutionary governments institutionalize their monopolies on violence impacts both whether mass protests catalyze civil wars and whether post-revolutionary governments face further civil war risks. One particular institution-two-tiered security systems-is particularly poor at coping with transitions in power. Two-tiered systems juxtapose communally stacked units that protect regimes from internal adversaries with larger regular forces that recruit more broadly and defend states from external opponents.
We argue, however, that although two-tiered systems are a rational response to the threats many authoritarian regimes face, they create acute and recurrent civil war risks whenever popular contestation escalates beyond a certain threshold. Such is the case because two-tiered systems are difficult for revolutionaries to swiftly unseat, yet lack the force needed to repress widespread uprisings. Stacked units generally fight for their regimes and prevent regular units from supplanting governments by coup d'état. These forces, however, lack the size to repress massive dissent. Regular forces, meanwhile, are likely to fracture when governments order them to employ indiscriminant violence against populations from which they were recruited.
Mass protests plunge two-tiered systems into civil war when regular units reassess their loyalties, yet regime protection units fight on. States with such systems are also prone to follow-on civil wars after anti-regime forces triumph because of the likely fragmentation of their post-revolutionary security environments. Within the victorious rebel coalition, defectors from the regular armed forces and civilian insurgents will vie for power and resist integration into a new national military. The remnants of the previous regime's stacked units will also likely challenge the new regime whenever they possess the requisite firepower.
The Military Loyalty Problématique
A monopoly on force within a territory has long been considered critical to modern states. Max Weber posited that an entity could only be defined as a state when it 'successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.'
1 While few disagree with Weber, there is no consensus as to what types of force states must possess. In principle, regimes need force for some combination of the following: 1) quelling domestic unrest; 2) defending against foreign adversaries; and 3) protecting the regime from a coup d'état.
Scholars since the 2011 Arab Spring have shed new light on when militaries loyally execute the first mission. One popular explanation attributes variations in behavior to whether armed forces are 'institutionalized' or 'patrimonial'. According to Eva Bellin, institutionalized militaries exist independently from regimes and can therefore accept the latters' fall. By way of contrast, clientelistic ties connect patrimonial militaries to regimes to such a degree that the former cannot subsist without the latter.
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Holger Albrecht extends this dichotomy to officers' self-enrichment, with institutional militaries providing revenues independent of the regime and patrimonial ones connecting officers to the regime via the executive's provision of rents.
3
Despite its plausibility, the institutional/patrimonial dichotomy provides an imperfect metric. To begin with, the institutional/patrimonial dichotomy cannot account for the range of outcomes-including militaries obeying governments, turning against them, splintering and provoking post-revolutionary civil wars-observed during the Arab Spring. Michael Makara suggests that the dichotomy also over-simplifies a range of practices, such as communal stacking policies and the creation of parallel militaries. 4 Many militaries, indeed, combine institutional and patrimonial characteristics.
Patrimonialism can, for example, dictate senior appointments or determine elite units' recruitments even in militaries otherwise organized along institutional lines. Furthermore, as Alejandro Pachon demonstrates, states structure their militaries in response to particular threat matrices. 5 To understand how any military will behave, scholars must therefore examine the historic processes by which the state developed security institutions.
Designing institutions appropriate to the precise threats that a state faces is, however, a fraught process. Although Naunihal Singh shows that such "coups from below" are less likely to succeed, they nonetheless account for one-sixth of coup attempts and nine percent of successful coups.
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Regimes can guard against these threats by adopting a more comprehensive form of stacking, wherein they fill the enlisted ranks as well with members of the President's community. In principle, this should reinforce the military's willingness to suppress unrest and reduce the incentives for any military faction to attempt a coup by aligning the interests of junior officers and rank-and-file personnel with those of the regime.
Governments, such as André Kolingba's in the Central African Republic (1981 Republic ( -1993 and Paul Kagame's in Rwanda (1994-present) and interviews conducted in Libya-to provide a more detailed account than hitherto possible of Libya's systems' emergence and impact.
Libya Between Internal and External Threats
The Libyan state's creation in 1951 confronted its government with the dilemma of how to structure the state's monopoly of force. King Idris I doubted his ability to control a national military. He therefore preferred to rely on his tribally stacked paramilitary force, the Cyrenaican Defense Force (CYDEF), and kept the regular military small and officered by foreigners. Mounting external threats broke down Idris' initial model for controlling the military in 1956-58. He thereafter developed a two-tiered system, wherein an increasingly heavily armed CYDEF counterbalanced an everexpanding military. Idris' two-tiered system sustained his rule until 1969, but the coup that overthrew him nearly plunged Libya into civil war.
The territory known as Libya encompasses three distinct entities: Tripolitania in the northwest, Cyrenaica in the northeast and the Fezzan in Libya's southern deserts.
Mirroring these geographic divisions, distinct forces shaped each region. Tripolitania was deeply influenced by the Ottoman Turks, through the ruling Turkish Qaramanli dynasty (until 1835) and then by direct Ottoman rule (until 1911 pro-Sanusi forces defeated the plotters, the latter would likely execute Hasan, leaving the country without a king fit to govern.
These considerations, along with Britain's refusal to intervene, broke the paramilitaries' will. When three of the plotters' regiments advanced on 4 Septemberthree days after the coup-they met no resistance, with CYDEF and the Guard melting into the population. Libya's monarchy thus fell after 18 years of striving to reconcile the regime's need for an army and that self-same regime's fear of coups. Idris' initial instinct to dispense with a national military and his subsequent efforts to make do with a miniscule one faltered because of Libya's increasingly fraught environment. Idris' security then depended for more than a decade upon a two-tiered system, wherein his communallystacked paramilitaries counterbalanced his growing army.
The Rise of Libya's Centralized Armed Forces
Gaddafi and the officers who joined him in overthrowing Idris sought to remodel the state's security institutions. They endeavored to win the military's loyalty and garner public support by using an expanded military to pursue popular policy objectives. Despite the largess lavished on the armed forces, Gaddafi never fully trusted his military. He, therefore, even during this period, replicated elements of Idris' two-tiered system by creating a Revolutionary Guard as a countercoup force and Revolutionary Committees to quell dissent. Gaddafi's policy of buying loyalty with lavish resources and leading his military into popular wars thus miscarried because Gaddafi failed to forge a sufficiently efficient tool and committed his fledgling forces to conflicts for which they were inadequate.
The Decline of Libya's Centralized Armed Forces
Gaddafi's early model for securing the military's loyalty collapsed in the 1990s. Gaddafi's government began explicitly creating tribally stacked units after the LIFG's defeat. Gaddafi considered kinship the surest guarantee of loyalty and therefore gave three sons-Khamis, Moatassim and Saadi-brigades recruited from loyal tribes.
The most formidable of these was Khamis' 32 nd Brigade, which possessed 10,000 personnel and ample heavy weaponry. Moatassim, however, played an equally significant role presiding over Libya's National Security Commission. 83 Gaddafi granted a cousin, Barani Ishkal, command of a fourth brigade, the Al-Magarief Brigade, which maintained order in Libya's capital. 84 Other Gaddafi cousins, Ahmed Gadhaf al-Dam and Khalifa
Hanaish, also played important roles.
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Gaddafi employed matrimonial alliances to further this policy of leveraging kinship to protect his regime. Gaddafi, for example, married one of his sons to the daughter of his Revolutionary Committees' director, Khuwaylidi Hamidi. 86 Gaddafi also married his sister-in-law to his intelligence chief Abdallah al-Sanusi, and his daughter, Aisha, to a cousin, Ahmed al-Gaddafi al-Qahsi, who commanded another security brigade. 87 Gaddafi made further dispositions to hire mercenaries and arm loyal tribes to bolster these security brigades in the event of significant unrest.
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Libya thus possessed a full-fledged two-tiered system by the 2011 revolution's eve. Small numbers of stacked units provided the regime's primary defense against domestic threats, while Libya's larger regular forces suffered from weak cohesion because of poor funding and Gaddafi's deliberate coup-proofing. 
Mass Protests and Security Sector Fragmentation
Although Gaddafi's two-tiered system enabled him to cling to power through the Each of the revolt's four foyers-Benghazi, Misrata, Derna and the Nafousa Mountainsproduced, however, a different combination of armed groups.
Considering that opposition to Gaddafi was always most acute in Cyrenaica, which had been the monarchy's powerbase, this region was first to rebel. The revolt began in January 2011 with discontented inhabitants seizing vacant apartment buildings. When the regime responded with brutality, anti-regime protests escalated to a full-scale rebellion. Cyrenaica's elites and principal tribes rapidly joined this rebellion. Gaddafi's failure to crush the rebellion swiftly condemned him to lose slowly to it. Rebels grew in strength and NATO airpower prevented Gaddafi's security brigades from using heavy weapons. The regime forces' gradual exhaustion and the rebels' mounting strength then reached a tipping point, catalyzing the simultaneous collapse of pro-Gaddafi forces in Misrata, Cyrenaica and the Nafousa. Rebels from the Nafousa and an ad hoc flotilla of Misratans aboard small boats exploited the regime's disarray to swarm into Tripoli. Many too timorous to join the uprising so long as the war's issue was uncertain now swelled the rebellion's ranks in its hour of victory.
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Civil War Redux
Although the rebellion's triumph was total, Gaddafi's two-tiered system created the pre-conditions for the anarchy that later engulfed Libya. 
Conclusion
Two-tiered systems provide a rational response to the challenges confronting many authoritarian leaders. That Idris and Gaddafi both eventually embraced two-tiered systems, despite initially favoring other practices, testifies to these systems' utility. While these systems protected regimes from modest domestic and international threats, they another, stacked units' remnants challenged the new order whenever they could. These Two-tiered systems' provision of robust short-term security for regimes, yet negative long-term impact on states' ability to accommodate political change, renders them toxic for states' development. Discouraging governments from adopting such systems will be difficult, however, since regimes will likely discount the long-term civil war risks that their societies bare as an adequate price to pay for the comparatively high levels of regime security that two-tiered systems provide.
